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Abstract
We examine an environment with n voters each with a private value over two alternatives.
We compare the social surplus of two mechanisms for deciding between them: majority voting
and shouting. In majority voting, the choice with the most votes wins. With shouting, the voter
who shouts the loudest (sends the costliest wasteful signal) chooses the outcome. We nd that
it is optimal to use voting in the case where n is large and value for each particular alternative
of the voters is bounded. For other cases, the superior mechanism is depends upon the order
statistics of the distribution of values.
1 Introduction
Voting is one of the pillars of democracy.1 ;2 While voting is desirable for determining a countrys
government, it is less clear whether policies should be decided by direct voting (referendum) or
indirectly through elected politicians which then may incorporate the use of petitions or lobbying
activity. While majoritarian voting procedures such as rst past the post aggregates opinions of
the individual voters, they have the disadvantage that they ignore how much an individual voter
cares about the issues (see Chakravarty, Kaplan and Myles, 2010).
Department of Economics, University of Exeter Business School, Exeter, UK; email: S.Chakravarty@exeter.ac.uk
yDepartment of Economics, University of Exeter Business School, Exeter, UK and Department of Economics,
University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel; email: Dr@ToddKaplan.com
1The denition of democracy is provided by the U.S. Department of State at
http://usinfo.org/mirror/usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/whatsdem/whatdm2.htm
2Voting procedures are also used in dictatorships. For instance, a dictator may make use of committees in order
to prevent an individual from single-handedly reaching a decision. With such commitees, decisions are made through
voting (see Tullock, 1998).
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An alternative method of reaching a group decision is by allowing would-be voters to send a
signal of how much they care: we call this a shout.3 With this method, we would expect that
voters with strong preferences or special interest groups to have greater inuence on the outcome
than with voting. This is due to the ability of voters with more extreme preferences to send a
stronger signal by shouting louder. Such undue inuence is not necessarily harmful; shouting may
be welfare enhancing over voting since under voting the outcome can be determined by a large
number of voters that do not strongly care about the outcome or vote without any information
about the specic issues.4 The objective of this paper is determine under which conditions, if any,
shouting leads to a more e¢ cient solution than voting.5
In our analysis, we make three key modelling assumptions. First, each voter has a private
valuation over the outcome of a decision. Second, while in order for shouting to act as a signal
for a voter it must be costly to that voter, we also assume that it is completely socially wasteful
in that no one benets from the noise of shouting.6 Hence, we have in mind a class of problems
where voters should not be able to buy votes (as with shareholders of companies), but rather one
where there would be a moral repugnance if the decision could be bought such as with a safety
law, jury verdict, a worker promotion or hiring decision.7 ;8 Third, we assume that shouting does
not add, therefore, only he who shouts the loudest is heard. From this, one can see that our notion
of shouting is that of a contest.9
3Shouting can also be thought of as lobbying. See the discussion in the conclusion.
4Tullock gives the example that according to Pew poll in 1996 elections only 75% of the voters claimed that they
were well informed enough to select the candidates (Tullock, 1998, page 148-149).
5We follow papers such as Börgers (2004) in making Pareto comparisions of voting and shouting by analyzing all
the votersex-ante expected utility. Hence, we say a mechanism is more e¢ cient if all the voters have higher ex-ante
expected utility. In doing so, we also depart from the pairwise independence condition of Arrow (1951) in that we
claim if two voters (very) weakly prefer A to B and one voter strongly prefers B to A, then society should choose B,
while if the strength of preferences is the same for all voters, then society should choose A.
6See Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) as one of the earlier papers where lobbying activity provides information
to the legislators.
7Alternatively, allowing votes to be bought or sold could create an opportunity for exploitation. Thus, even if voting
buying were accepted morally, there could be an economic justication for banning such behaviour. For instance, a
land owner may signicantly gain from rezoning to permit construction of large luxury apartments buildings; however,
these building could block the view of neighboring buildings and their grandiose size could annoy the populace. With
vote buying, this landowner could prot by buying votes, even if him winning was socially ine¢ cient due to the
externalities. Dekel, Jackson and Wolinsky (2008) model vote buying when it is socially acceptable using a sequential
game.
8Note that acceptability may change with time. For instance, between 1683 and 1871, commissions were often
bought and sold in the British army.
9While it may be also worthwhile to investigate when shouting adds, doing so would be modelling shouting as a
public good (for those who favour the same outcome). This would also introduce free-rider problems into shouting.
Because of this, we feel that non-additive shouting is the cleanest case to examine.
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In this paper, we compare the surplus of voting to that of shouting. We nd that it is optimal
to use voting in the case where the number of voters is large and value of each voter is bounded.
Furthermore, if the hazard rate is increasing, then, for any n, voting is superior to shouting if the
expected value of a voter (for his preferred option) is higher than two-thirds the expected maximum
of two votersvalues. More generally, for n voters, voting is superior to shouting if and only if the
expected value times n!!(n 1)!! if n is odd (
(n 1)!!
(n 2)!! if n is even) is higher than the expected highest
value minus the expected second-highest value.10
The general intuition for our results is that voting has the advantage of lower costs and aggre-
gating everyones rough preference. Shouting has the advantage of taking into account strength of
preference but the disadvantage of being wasteful. For an illustration, take the discrete distribution
of there being a p chance of having a value of 1 and a (1 p) chance of having value 0. The expected
value is p, while for two voters, the expected di¤erence between the highest and second highest
value is 2p(1  p). Hence, shouting is superior if and only if p  2p(1  p) or p  1=2: This shows
that when there is a lower likelihood of an extreme value, a high-value voter can then shout and
win at a lower cost.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we will describe the model and
equilibrium. In section 3, we will specify the results and in the last section, we conclude.
2 Model
2.1 Description
In our model, there are n  2 voters that as a group must decide between two alternatives. Let us
call the two alternatives A and B. Each voter has a utility (value vi) for B over A that is privately
known. This di¤erence is drawn independently on V = [ v; v] with negative numbers implying
that the voter prefers A to B. The cumulative distribution of values is identical for each voter and
denoted by G. We assume that the distribution is symmetric, that is, G0(x) = G0( x). Denote F
as the conditional distribution given that v is positive, that is, F = (G(x) G(0))=(G(v) G(0)):
Given the above group decision problem, we consider two possible methods for selecting an
alternative: voting by majority rule or selection by shouting. Under majority rule, each voter
10Note that the double factorial; n!!; is either all strictly positive even numbers up to n multiplied together or all
strictly positive odd numbers up to n multiplied together depending upon whether n is even or odd.
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costlessly casts a ballot for his preferred option. Choice A wins if the number of votes it receives,
denoted by #A; is strictly greater the number of votes choice B receives, denoted by #B. Choice B
wins #B > #A. There is a tie if #B = #A and in such a case, the winner is determined randomly
with equal probability. Under shouting, each voter i chooses an alternative to shout for and a level
to shout. We use si to represent both by having the absolute value as the strength of shouting
and the sign as the chosen option to shout for (positive for option B and negative for option A).
By shouting, the utility of voter i is lowered by jsij. The voter with the loudest individual shout
chooses.
2.2 Equilibrium and Social Surplus
Voting
If voting is used, in equilibrium, voter i will vote for his preferred candidate: i.e., for B, if
vi > 0 and A if vi < 0. To examine social surplus under such an equilibrium, rst consider three
voters. There are two possible margins of victory: all three voters are in agreement or there is
a two-to-one majority. In the case where all three voters are in agreement, the expected sum of
values is 3E[vjv > 0]. When there is a two-to-one majority, the expected surplus is E[vjv > 0]:
Combining these yields the social surplus (the ex-ante expected utility):
(1=4)3E[vjv > 0] + (3=4)E[vjv > 0]
=
3
2
Z v
0
vdF:
For example, if F is uniform on [0; 1], then the social surplus is 3=4: In a similar manner, we nd
the social surplus from voting in the case of n voters is:
Svote
def
=
nX
i=1
i  wiE[vjv > 0] =
nX
i=1
i  wi 
Z v
0
vdF;
where wi is the chance of winning by i votes and given by
wi =
8<: 0 if n  i is odd,  n
(n i)=2

1
2n 1 otherwise.
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Shouting
Now consider the alternative mechanism of selecting an alternative for the group: shouting.
According to this the voter who shouts the loudest gets heard and his choice wins. Each voter
will have a shouting strategy of a shouting function based upon value, si : V 7! R: A Bayes-Nash
equilibrium is the set of shouting functions fsig, such that given the other shouting functions, no
voter has incentive to change his shouting function.
Let us look at the social surplus in a symmetric equilibrium where the equilibrium is symmetric
in two distinct ways. First, all voters use the same shouting function, s. Second, the shouting
function is symmetric w.r.t. to either option, that is, s(v) =  s( v). Since only the loudest voter
counts, the gains from the outcome is the expected value of the highest voter:
R v
0 vdF
n (due to
independence, the expected value of the winning option for the other voters is zero). The cost
incurred from the shouting equilibrium is n
R v
0 s(v)dF . Hence, the social surplus from shouting is
Sshout
def
=
Z v
0
vdFn   n
Z v
0
s(v)dF: (1)
3 Results
In this section, we determine under which conditions the social surplus of shouting is superior to
the social surplus of voting and vice-versa. We start by writing Sshout in terms of order statistics.
In doing so, we will be able to investigate certain properties as a function of the number of voters.
Lemma 1 The social surplus of shouting, Sshout, equals Xn;n   Xn 1;n, where Xi;j denotes the
i th-order statistic of j random variables drawn iid from distribution F .
Proof. If we have n voters and the group chooses according to the loudest member of the group
then each voter will face the following problem,
(v) = max
s
F (v(s))n 1v   s:
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This is the same problem that a bidder faces in a standard all-pay auction of incomplete information.
Using the envelope theorem 0(v) = F (v)n 1: Thus,
(v) =
Z v
0
F (v)n 1dv = F (v)n 1v   s:
This implies
s(v) = F (v)n 1v  
Z v
0
F (v)n 1dv:
Substituting this into equation (1) yields
Sshout = n
Z v
0
Z v
0
F (v)n 1dvdF: (2)
Integration by parts yields
Sshout = n
Z v
0
F (v)n 1dv   n
Z v
0
F (v)ndv: (3)
This also equals the expected value of the highest voter minus the expected value of the second
highest voter. This di¤erence is
Z v
0
vdFn  
Z v
0
vd(Fn + n(1  F )Fn 1) =
n
Z v
0
vdFn   n
Z v
0
vdFn 1:
Integration by parts yields (3). Note that the expected social surplus by shouting will equal the
expected surplus of the highest bidder in a standard auction framework.
Lemma 2 Xn;n Xn 1;n is decreasing (increasing) in n if the hazard rate, F 0=(1 F ); is increasing
(decreasing) .
Proof. From (2),Xn;n Xn 1;n = n
R
Fn 11 FF 0 dF: The derivative of this w.r.t. n is
R
(n  lnF + 1)Fn 1
1 F
F 0 dF: Notice that
R 1
0 (n  lnF + 1)Fn 1dF = Fn lnF j10  
R 1
0 F
n 1dF +
R 1
0 F
n 1dF = 0: Since
(n  lnF + 1)Fn 1 is increasing in F , then if 1 FF 0 is increasing (decreasing), the derivative is posi-
tive (negative). Thus, if F 0=(1  F ) is increasing (decreasing), the derivative is negative (positive)
and Xn;n  Xn 1;n is decreasing (increasing) in n.
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The rst lemma shows that the social surplus of shouting is the expected value of the highest-
valued voter, Xn;n; minus the waste of signalling which is the expected value of the second highest-
valued voter, Xn 1;n. The second lemma shows the sign of the hazard rate determines whether
the gain of an increased highest value outweighs the increased cost of signalling. Together, these
two lemmas show that when the hazard rate is increasing (decreasing), social surplus of shouting
is decreasing in the number of voters. Next we show properties of voting in relation to n.
Lemma 3 Svote is weakly increasing n and limn!1 Svote =1:
Proof. Notice that
Pn
i=1 i  wi is the expected absolute value of the distance of the random walk
from zero. We make use of known results in this proof. (See Weisstein, 2010, for an excellent review
of one-dimensional random walks.) This equals
Svote =
Z v
0
vdF 
8<:
(n 1)!!
(n 2)!! if n is even,
n!!
(n 1)!! if n is odd.
(4)
This is weakly increasing in n: if n is odd, Svote does not increase going to n+ 1: The expression
n!!
(n 1)!! increases by a factor of
n+2
n+1 going to
(n+2)!!
(n+1)!! : As n!1, Svote approximates
R v
0 vdF 
q
2n
 .
Hence, limn!1 Svote =1:
Unlike shouting, the surplus from voting unambiguously improves with the number of voters.
We can now compare the two surpluses.
Proposition 1 For large n, if v is bounded, then voting is superior to shouting.
Proof. Since Svote is increasing and limn!1 Svote =1, there is an n where Svote > v such that
for all n  n, Svote > v  Sshout:
The intuition of the prior proposition is that as the number of voters increase, the expected
number of voters favoring one option over another increases and there is no bound to this increase.
Thus, the gains from choosing the most popular option goes up and eventually surpasses the gains
from shouting since these gains is always limited to one voters value. In the following proposition,
we can compare voting to shouting for any particular n.
Proposition 2 For n voters, voting is superior to shouting if and only if X1;1  n!!(n 1)!!  Xn;n  
Xn 1;n if n is odd, otherwise if and only if X1;1  (n 1)!!(n 2)!!  Xn;n  Xn 1;n if n is even.
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Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 1 and equation (4).
Corollary 1 For two voters, voting is superior to shouting if and only if the expected value of a
voter is higher than two-thirds the expected maximum of the two voters values.
Proof. For two voters, Svote =
R v
0 vdF and Sshout = 2
R v
0 F (v)dv   2
R v
0 F (v)
2dv: Integration by
parts yields, Sshout = 2
R v
0 vdF
2   2 R v0 vdF: Comparison, yields voting is superior i¤ 23 R v0 vdF 2 <R v
0 vdF: (Note that this does not imply Xn;n  Xn 1;n = 2=3 Xn;n.)
Proposition 3 If the hazard rate is increasing and X1;1  X2;2  X1;2; then voting is superior for
all n  2.
Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 2 and Lemma 2.
Note as with the above Corollary, X1;1  X2;2  X1;2 is equivalent to the expected value of a
voter being higher than two-thirds the expected maximum of two voters values.
The following example shows when the social surplus under shouting would be greater than
that under voting.
Example 2 n = 2; F (v) = v; 0 <  < 1=2:
For shouting, we have:
Sshout = n
Z v
0
F (v)n 1dv   n
Z v
0
F (v)ndv = n
Z 1
0
(v)n 1dv   n
Z 1
0
(v)ndv =
n
(n  1) + 1  
n
n+ 1
=
n
((n  1) + 1) (n+ 1) =
2
(+ 1) (2+ 1)
:
For voting, the surplus is Svote =
Pn
i=1 i  wi 
R v
0 vdF =
R 1
0 v  (v 1)dv = +1 : Thus,
Sshout > Svote () 22+1 > 1() 1=2 > :
When  < 1=2 there is a higher likelihood of a large mass of low value voters. In such a case
when there are large number of poorly informed voters, who do not value the decision too highly,
then a decision by shouting is more socially e¢ cient. From data cited in the New York Times
regarding minimum wage legislation, while 84% of American citizens believed that minimum wage
should be increased, 22% actually knew what the current minimum wage was.11 In such a case it is
11This example is taken from Tullock (1998). For the story check New York Times
April 19, 1996. http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/19/us/notebook-the-minimum-wage-a-
portrait.html?scp=2&sq=april%2019%201996&st=cse
8
probable that decision making by shouting or lobbying with the better informed legislators would
be more e¢ cient than direct vote on the issue by uninformed voters.
Next we provide an example where voting is more e¢ cient than shouting.
Example 3 n  2; F (v) = v;   1.
From the previous example, when n = 2 and   1; voting is superior (actually, voting is
superior for 1    1=2, as well). The hazard rate F 0=(1  F ) is increasing for all   1: Hence,
voting is superior for all n.
Voting is more e¢ cient in case it is more likely that there is a large number of voters who value
the outcome highly and therefore will be better informed. Direct voting (referendum) is observed in
number of places including Switzerland and California. In most cases of direct voting a signicant
number of signatures are required to put a particular issue for vote in the ballot. As a result,
voters here are likely to have strong feelings regarding issues which are put up for direct voting in a
referendum. For example, Oregon passed a highly divisive issue, assisted suicide, into law in 1994
in a referendum.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we delineate the conditions when voting is superior to shouting and vice-versa by
means of order statistics. It is also possible to interpret these conditions in terms of likelihood of
voters having extreme values. Consider the example of an academic department deciding on the
date for a departmental picnic. For most members, most dates will be suitable (or the member
would not lose signicant utility missing it). Though less likely, it is possible that a member would
have a conict that cannot be resolved and this member has a strong preference for attending. In
such a case, a shouting mechanism will result in the preferred choice of this member. If instead the
department used voting, then the decision would be dominated by those without conicts or strong
interest increasing the likelihood that the member with a tight schedule and a strong interest would
not be able to attend.
Now instead of choosing a department picnic date if the department were considering hiring a
full professor and had to choose from a variety of elds. In this case, we argue that the decision
should be made by voting and not shouting. In such a case, it is more than likely that department
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members would have extreme values or special interests for particular candidates (for instance,
elds such as experimental economics or econometric theory). This increases the chance of a high
degree of shouting which should favor simple majority voting.
Our notion of shouting mirrors the process of lobbying. Normally, lobbying is thought to be
socially wasteful and policies for reducing it have been analyzed, for instance putting a cap on the
amount of lobbying (see Che and Gale, 1998, 2006, and Kaplan and Wettstein, 2006). This paper
shows that in fact while wasteful in itself, lobbying can be a useful tool for making decisions since
it signals value.
Another way to look at our results, which is left for future work is in terms of common value
and private value of the choices. If the alternatives have common values for the voters then cost
of collecting signals through shouting can be avoided and the decision can be reached by voting
without much loss of allocative e¢ ciency. While in case of private values, the costly signals sent
through shouting can play an important role in reaching a better decision.
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